19601

COMMENTS

to the job, renegotiation of agreements is necessary to resolve the dispute although pending renegotiation the carrier should be subject to double liability.
As consolidated proceedings appear desirable in order to determine either
that the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the existing agreement or that
no such resolution is possible, notice should in all cases be given to the nonsubmitting union. In view of the ambiguous language of section 3 first (j)40 such
a resolution of work-assignments appears permissable within the existing statute. It is arguable, however, that under these proposals labor members of the
Board would press for decisions running m favor of both unions, while carrier
members would press for decisions selecting between the two union and this
might result in the same sort of deadlock which now exists with respect to the
notice question. It would seem, however, that, with some definite clarification
of the notice issue and the scope of the Board's authority in work-assignment
disputes, both the partisan members and the independent referees would be
constrained to render more consistent decisions along the lines suggested.
Absent thoroughgoing revision of the structure of the RLA,41 a more satisfactory solution seems unlikely.
40See text at note 10 sopra.
41 See Garrison, supra note 2, at 595; Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 303, 321 (1951).

CHANGE OF VENUE: IN REM ACTIONS
The recent admiralty case of Continental Grain Company v. Federal Barge
Lines, Inc.' raised the unusual question of the transferability of a libel in rem
under section 1404(a)2 of the judicial Code, the general change of venue provision. Claimant Federal Barge Lines moved for a transfer of the libel in rem from
the Louisiana district court in which the action had been brought to the Tennessee district in which the sinking complained of had occurred, and in which the
claimant was the plaintiff in an in personam action at law, based on the same
sinking, against the in rem libelant. The claimant was granted a change of venue,
and on appeal3 the transfer order was affirmed. In upholding the transfer of an
in rem action, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found it necessary to
1268

F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 811 (1959).

2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958): "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest

of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought."
3The lower court's decision was reviewed under the new interlocutory appeals act. 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). Prior to its enactment 1404(a) transfer orders could only be reviewed
by a petition for a writ of mandamus against the district court judge, since they are not final
decrees. See, Kaufman, FurtherObservations On Transfers Under Section 1404(a), 56 CoLur. L.
Rxv. 1-11 (1956).
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deal with two distinct problems: 4 (1)"conveyance of an adequate res to the
transferee forum, 5 (2) satisfaction of the requirements imposed by the "where it
might have been brought" language of 1404(a). 6
I
The theory of an in rem action creates the problem of transporting an adequate res to the transferee forum. If the action is to retain its in rem nature
subsequent to transfer, there must be a res within the transferee district on
which judgment may be rendered.7 Early admiralty cases, faced with the problem of transporting the res from one district to another, denied transfers altogether.5 In the ContinentalGrain case, however, an additional factor was present
-a stipulation to abide decree had been filed in lieu of the res.
The stipulation to abide decree, filed by the claimant shipowner, has become
well established in admiralty as a device to release the vessel, 9 which is commonly treated as the offending party in a libel in rem. 10 When released, the ship
is permitted to resume its commercial role without jeopardizing the libelant's
security interest in the outcome of the action. Once filed the stipulation becomes
a complete substitute for the res for purposes of judgment satisfaction. On this
basis, the ContinentalGraincase concluded that the transferee district, in virtue
of the receipt of the stipulation, obtained control of the substitute res which was
as adequate as it would have been in the transferor district.
4

Any problem as to the application of the "any civil action" language of 1404(a) to admiralty libels has been settled. Arrowhead v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1951);
Broussard v. The Jersbek, 140 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
6 Continental Grain Company v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
6Id at 243.
7 The alternative to the presence of the res in the transferee district is allowing one federal
district court to enter judgment on a res located in another district, a result inconsistent with
the traditional territorial limitations on a district court's power. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439, 467 (1945) (dicta); Edgerly v. Kennelly, 215 F.2d 420, 422 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, -348 U.S. 938 (1955) FED. R. Civ. P. 82. But the argument might be made that 28
U.S.C. § 1963 (1958), providing for the registration of other district court judgments, justifies
such a result. This section provides that: "a judgment so registered shall have the same effect
as a judgment of the district court where registered and may be enforced in like manner." However, its application in the in rem context presupposes that a district court would litigate an in
rem action without the presence of a res, an assumption that does not seem warranted.
At the time these cases were decided there was no statutoryprohibition on admiralty transfers, nor was there any specific statutory authorization for them. Keene v. United States,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 310 (1809); The Little Ann, 15 Fed. Cas. 622 (No. 8397) (C.C.N.Y.
1810); The Idaho, 29 Fed. 187, 192 (D. Ore 1886). But cf. United States v. Four Part Pieces of
Woolen Cloth, 25 Fed. Cas. 1180 (No. 15150) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1825) (transfer granted in a nonadmiralty in rem case).
. 9 GEN. ADminALTY Rum.s 11, 12, 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1958); 2 BENEDicT, A
nmnnr § 368
(6th ed. 1940).
SGiLmORE & BLAcK, AmmALTY § 9-4 (1957); WAPLES, PROceDmNGs IN REM § 1 (1882).
"J. K. Welding Co. v. Gotham Marine Corp., 47 F.2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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In spite of the fact that objections might be made, extension of the use of the
stipulation device to transfer situations seems clearly justifiable. It is arguable
that any originating forum must have jurisdiction over the res itself before the
substitution by stipulation may become effective. Consequently, it would be
equally necessary that the transferee district have initial jurisdiction of the res
before a substitution might be made. Since it has been held that a stipulation
may be filed before the arrest of the res, even where there is no indication that
such an arrest is possible, 12 this position is obviously baseless. The alternative
contention has been made that it is the libelant-claimant agreement to the
stipulation, and not the stipulation itself, which gives a court this substitute
jurisdiction.13 It would then follow that a 1404(a) transfer without the libelant's
consent, as was the situation in the ContinentalGrain case, could not operate to
give the transferee forum jurisdiction of the res. The premise of this proposition
appears erroneous in view of the fact that a libelant has no basis for objection to
the introduction of a stipulation in the action, once the court obtains jurisdiction
of the original res.1 4 Likewise, in the case of a collusive suit, i.e. the use of a
stipulation initially to give jurisdiction without the presence of an actual res at
any time, the libelant's volition would seem to be limited to the act of filing the
in rem action.15 Once filing has occurred, and a res that is sufficient to satisfy a
judgment is before the court, the claimant should be able to take advantage of
the stipulation's incidental attribute of being more physically capable of transfer
than a vessel. Mloreover, in the in personam area the transferee forum does not
have to assert a jurisdictional basis for hearing the action, provided proper
jurisdiction existed in the original forum.16 So also, in an in rem action, if the
transferee court has in its possession a stipulation, which was adequate to confer
in rem jurisdiction on the transferor forum, it seems beyond dispute that it has
competent jurisdiction.
II

In addition to the establishment of the stipulation device to facilitate the
movement of a res to the transferee forum, the "where it might have been
brought" limitation of 1404(a) raises a second problem in the transfer of an in
12The Providence, 293 Fed. 595 (D.R.I. 1923); Republic of Turkey v. Zadeh, 112 F. Supp.
933 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Diacon-Zadeh v. Devlet Denizyollari, 127 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Pa 1954);
2 BENEDIcT, ADurnALT § 242 (6th ed. 1940).
" Brief for Petitioner, p. 8, Continental Grain Company v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., cerl.
granted, 361 U.S. 811 (1959).
14
The discretionary power of the court controls the use of a stipulation to abide decree.
The Lydia, 1 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 616 (1924); 2 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY
§ 363 (6th ed. 1940).
I' The Providence, 293 Fed. 595 (D.R.I. 1923); Diacon-Zadeh v. Devlet Denizyollari, 127
F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
16Cf. Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410, 414 (D.N.M. 1949).
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rein action. A libel in rem may be brought only where the res is, 7 or will be, 18 so
that no transferee district can qualify as one where the action might have been
brought, if that language is construed as meaning originallybrought. This is the
interpretation which some courts have given to these words in in personam
litigation, 9 and the one which seems most likely on the face of the statute.
Other courts 0 have given these words a broader construstion, based on the
"post consent" or waiver theory. Under this theory it has been reasoned that the
defendant may waive venue and jurisdiction privileges2' to make the transferee
district, retrospectively, one in which the action might have been brought. The
court in the ContinentalGrain case, by adopting the "post consent" theory in an
in rem action, allowed the claimant to waive jurisdictional objections in the
transferee forum, and so satisfied the "where it might have been brought"
clause.
Independent of the applicability of the "post consent" theory to in rem actions, its validity as a device to satisfy the "where it might have been brought"
language of 1404(a) has been questioned. Since 1404(a) was adopted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 22 which presupposes at least
two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process, 3 it is argued that the
transferee district must, in turn, be one which originally was available. It would
seem, however, that this objection is weakened in view of the development and
increased acceptance of conditional dismissals in forum non conveniens cases.
This practice of permitting a dismissal upon the defendant's agreement to waive
24
objections, which he might have to the renewal of the action in another forum,
Gm. ADmI1ALTY R. 22, 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1958).
18Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1955).
17

19Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 904 (1959),
commented on favorably: 57 Mci. L. Rsv. 772 (1959), 27 GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 604 (1959),
45 VA. L. REv. 291 (1959). But see Comment, 72 HAgv. L. REv. 1375 (1959). Behimer v.
Sullivan, 261 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 809 (1959); General Electric Co.
v. Central Transit Whse. Co., 127 F. Supp. 817, 824-26 (W.D. Mo. 1955); United States v.
Reid, 104 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
2
0Ex
parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872 (1957); In re
Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954); Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952) (could have originally been brought against some defendants
in the transferee forum); Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1952) (could have originally been brought against some defendants in the
transferee forum).
21
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929); Neirbo v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 18 (1942).
2" Reviser's
23

Note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1950).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).

24 Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 424 (1932) (dismissal conditioned on agreement to appear and file security); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Bristol City Line
of S.S., 41 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) (dismissal conditioned on agreement to appear);
Giatilis v. The Darnie, 171 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D. Md. 1959) (dismissal conditioned on agreement not to assert jurisdictional objections).
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appears to be more consistent with the post consent cases, since both afford
access to an originally unavailable forum.
Aside from the forum non conveniens argument, the further objection has
been made that the "post consent" theory enables the defendant to transfer an
action to any district in the country, thereby rendering the "where it might have
been brought" language meaningless. 25 Though a wider range of transferee
forums is available under the "post consent" theory, the "convenience of parties
and witnesses" and "interest of justice" language of 1404(a), like the "where it
might have been brought" language, is limiting in nature and would seem not
only to preclude the possibility of arbitrary nationwide transfers 26 but also to
result in a more equitable selection of forums. In addition, the "where it might
have been brought" language, rather than being rendered meaningless, has continued application under the "post consent" theory: where state law in the
transferee district would not allow this type of action to be heard;" where the
result of transfering to a particular district would be to defeat federal diversity
jurisdistion; 2s where a local action in rem is involved, since a federal district
court's jurisdiction is limited to its territorial boundaries; 29 and where the
plaintiff, who is unable to waive the jurisdiction and venue requirements, rather
than the defendant, is the movant 2 0
25 Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1958).
26 See Brown, Factors To Be Considered In Determining A Motion To Transfer Under 28
U.S.C.A. 1404(a), 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 117 (1958); Kaufman, FurtherObservations On Transfers
Under Section 1404(a), 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1-11 (1956).
27 Felchlin v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (state

statute prohibiting actions by non-resident executors). But see Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949) (dictum) (disallowance of anticipatory assertion of defenses available in transferee district to defeat transfer).
28
Lucas v. New York Central R.R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (realignment required in the transferee distrist).
29 Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105 (1895) (trespass to land in another federal
district); Pasos v. Pan American Airways, 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956) (trespass to land in a
foreign country). But see Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264 (1857) (trespass to try title
to land upheld on transfer to a district other than that in which the land was located). The
problem inherent in local action transfers, both in rem and in personam, is whether the law of
the transferor or transferee forum should control. In Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F.
Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash. 1952), the court, in denying transfer, applied the law of the transferee
forum which prohibited the trial of foreign trespass actions. The necessity, however, under the
Erie doctrine of applying the state law of the transferee forum may be questionable. Currie,
Change of Venue And The Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 405, 438-441 (1955). If the state
law of the transferor forum allowing the trial of foreign trespass actions were applied, the
transferee forum's prohibition would be ineffective. Though the question has not been explicitly raised, the implication of the Pasos case is that a state statute permitting the trial of
foreign trespasses will not confer the same latitude on a federal district court within that state.
The question of transferor-transferee law application in the local action area would then
become moot.
30 Foster Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel
Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950). These cases cannot be read as conclusively precluding the
obtaining of a change of venue by the plaintiff, but must be limited to those cases where jurisdiction and venue requirements are not satisfied in the transferee forum. Nor does this seem to
prejudice the plaintiff's rights, since his choice of forum is not absolute, even under the narrow
construstion of 1404(a).
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Even if the "post consent" theory be accepted as applicable to the in personam cases, it does not necessarily follow that its application to the in rem area
is equally valid. Conceptually, the fiction that the res is the offending party in
an in rem action may create doubts as to the claimant's ability to make the
same waivers as a defendant in an in personam action. Not only does this objection seem to carry the notion of the personality of the ship to an unwarranted
extreme, but it also ignores the relation of the claimant to the res. The claimant,
through his property interest in the res,3' becomes in effect the real party in interest. Evidence of this point is found in his right to file a stipulation to abide
decree, which, when accepted, makes the claimant personally liable to the extent
of the value of the res. 32 In view of the foregoing, the anology to the in personam
cases does not seem unwarranted. Indeed, courts appear to have recognized
the analogy by distinguishing the claimant-movant libels in rem, where transfer
has been granted,33 from the libelant-movant libels in rem, where transfer has
been denied. 4
Unlike the admiralty libels in rem, attempts under 1404(a) to transfer cases
in rem, arising under the Pure Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,35 have been unsuccessful, due to the adoption by these courts of the "originally might have been
brought" interpretation." If viewed exclusively in terms of the "where it might
"1The Two Marys, 12 Fed. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); The Cartona, 297 Fed. 827 (2d Cir. 1924).
"GEN. ADMIRALTY R. 12, 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1958); 2 BENEDicT,ADMIRALTY § 368 (6th ed.
1940).
"3Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1955). There is dictain the Torres case regarding a
collateral reason for transfer, based on the possibility of a seizure of the res in the transferee
district, since the ship travelled regularly between the transferor and the transferee districts.
This approach, if developed, results in a heretofore unused interpretation of 1404(a), which
would allow transfer when it could be demonstrated that the action might have been brought
in the transferee district at some previous time, though not at the same time the action was
brought in the transferor district. Aside from the possible evidentiary difficulties in establishing
that the res could have effectively been seized in the transferee district, and the question of time
limitations on such a possible seizure, this interpretation would reopen the jurisdictional question settled by Foster Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). A plaintiff or libelant
might bring an action where it was possible to obtain jurisdiction of a person or thing, and then
transfer to a district where such jurisdiction could not have been had when the action was
brought in the transferor district. Such a possibility, denying as it would the jurisdictional protection of defendants and claimants, makes this interpretation of 1404(a) undesirable.
34Broussard v. The Jersbek, 140 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); New Jersey Barging Corp.
v. T. A. D. Jones and Co., 135 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
'- 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1958). Section 334(a), (b) contains special change
of venue provisions in three enumerated situations: where a single libel based on misbranding
is involved, where multiple libels in different districts based on misbranding are involved, and
where multiple libels in different districts based on adulteration are involved. The 1404(a)
transfer cases have arisen under circumstances not covered by these provisions.
316
Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951
(1951); Clinton Foods, Inc. v. United States, 188 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 825 (1951); United States v. 91 Packages, 93 F. Supp. 763 (D.N.J. 1950); United States
v. 23 Gross Jars, 86 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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have been brought" language, the Pure Food Act cases would seem to be irreconcilable with the admiralty libels in rem. A synthesis may be possible, however, if the distinction that exists between the two groups of cases, in their ability to convey an adequate res to the transferee forum, be considered. The Pure
Food Act seizures differ from the admiralty libels in rem in that there is no established practice of stipulating for value in the former.37 The situation is similar to
that which existed in the pre-stipulation admiralty cases, in that transfer must
8
be denied altogether, or the res itself must be transferred;1
and, as in those admiralty cases, practical considerations would seem to militate against the transfer of the seized goods from one district to another. Even if the admiralty stipulation were to be established in the Pure Food Act cases, its utility is questionable since the ultimate execution of a destruction judgment is upon the seized
goods themselves,"' and not a substituted res. The admiralty cases, however,
render a money judgment on the substitute res, making the release of the actual
res immaterial. The difficulty that the courts have faced in the Pure Food Act
cases would thus seem to be an inability to convey an adequate res to the transferee forum, a situation which, it appears, has predetermined their adoption of
the "originally might have been brought" interpretation. Consequently, these
cases should not affect the validity of transfers when such a conveyance of the
res is possible, as in the ContinentalGrain case.
37The use of a bond is provided for under the Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 52 Stat.
1044 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334(d) (1958). However, its use is limited to the period
subsequent to the rendering of a judicial decree and would be of no effect in a transfer motion
prior to a trial.
3
1Itmight be argued that a third possibility is to allow the transferee district to render
judgment on a res in the transferor district. Such an argument might find some basis in
§ 334(0(2) which provides that the transferee district "shall have the powers ... which the
court from which removal was made would have had ...if such case had not been removed."
52 Stat. 1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334(0(2). However, it seems more probable that movants
under the general transfer provision are precluded from reliance on a section relating to special
change of venue provisions.
3952 Stat. 1044 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334(d) (1958).

